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Dickinson Law Review
Vol. XXXIII

January, 1929

No. 2

Corporate Stocks in Pennsylvania
Trusts*
It is fortunate that our Constitutional provision, requiring legislative enactments to express their subject
matter clearly in their titles, has no application to papers
read before this Association. Were it otherwise, any views
herein expressed would be doomed at the outset, for it
must be conceded that this title gives no reasonable intimation of what it purports to embrace.
Actually, it is addressed to some aspects of the rule
adopted by our Supreme Court with regard to extraordinary distributions made by corporations, the stock of which
is held by trustees under instruments of trust providing
for the payment of income to one or more beneficiaries
for life or other term of years, with remainder of the principal or corpus in fee to other designated persons.
Everyone is familiar with the increase of the number
of trusts which have been created in recent years.
Whether due to a realization by the public of the advisability of committing property to corporate trustees for management because of their experienced organization and
consequently superior ability to that of individual trustees,
or for whatever other reason, the fact that the creation
of trusts has largely increased is certainly vell known.
Everyone is equally familiar with the phenomenal increase in values of corporate securities throughout this
*Paper read June 28, 1928 at the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania
Bar Association.
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country for the last thirty years, and especially since the
World War. As a result of this corporate prosperity both
before and since the war, there have been large and frequent extraordinary distributions by thousands of successful corporations. Notable examples of this have been the.
liquidating dividends declared by the old Standard Oil
trust in 1911 as a result of the dissolution decreed by the
United States Supreme Court and the subsequent large distributions by the component parts resulting from that dissolution; also the recent 40 per cent. stock dividend declared by the United States Steel Corporation, and the two
100 per cent. stock dividends which have been declared by
the General Motors Corporation. These are but typical
and, while more widely known because of the large distributions involved and the large number of persons affected,
there have been numerous similar distributions by less well
known corporations throughout the country.
Companies with earning records enabling them to make
such distributions have naturally been attractive to investors, and those who have purchased these securities and who
have desired to provide for the care and support of those
dependent upon them, have placed many such securities under wills or deeds of trust in the hands of trustees, providing
that the income shall be paid to one or more persons for
life or other term and at the expiration of the income beneficiaries' interest that the corpus or principal should be paid
over to certain designated remaindermen.
In view of the frequency with which these extraordinary distributions have occurred and the extent to which the
respective rights of the life beneficiaries and the remaindermen have been affected, it is believed that some discussion of the treatment of these questions in Pennsylvania
may be of interest.
So far as ordinary cash dividends are concerned, it has
been almost universally held in all jurisdictions, as between
the various interests in trust estates, that these belong to
the interest entitled to the income at the time the dividend
is declared, regardless of when the profits or surplus from
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which they are declared have been earned. The reason
usually given is because dividends have always been considered as not apportionable (although they are now, both
in England under the Apportionment Act of 1870, i. e. 33
and 34 Victoria Chapter 35, and by Section 22 of our Fiduciaries' Act of 1917, which is modeled upon the British
Act), and because of the practical difficulty of determining
the exact amount of profits earned during the short intervals between the frequent payment of such dividends.
Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857); McKeown's Estate, 263
Pa. 78 (1919). Accordingly, they are deemed to have been
earned as of the date when declared, and if this occurs
after the inception of the trust they are awarded to the income beneficiary. If declared either before the inception
of the trust or after the termination of the interest of the
income beneficiary, they are awarded to the corpus or remaindermen. Ordinary cash dividends are therefore distributed pursuant to an arbitrary rule even in states like
Pennsylvania and New York where another and entirely
different theory of distribution obtains as to extraordinary
corporate distributions.
In the case of extraordinary distributions, there has
been a wide divergence in the rules for determining to what
interest and in what amounts these should be awarded.
Such distributions are of several different types. The
commonest is an extra cash dividend. Another example
is where the corporation capitalizes its surplus and to the
extent that it does so, issues ratably to its stockholders,
by way of stock dividend, the additional stock representing
such capitalization. Or, again, it may decide to obtain
fresh capital and in so doing offer the increased stock, representing the new capital, to its old stockholders for subscription at a price less than the then existing value per
share of the old stock. And, lastly, it may liquidate, and
distribute to its stockholders in the nature of a liquidating
dividend the total proceeds realized from its assets either
in cash or securities of other corporations.
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In this country three main theories governing such extraordinary distributions have been developed. The first
is the "Massachusetts rule" which corresponds virtually
to the modern English rule, and as the Massachusetts
courts have stated it, is as follows:
"A simple rule is to regard cash dividends, however
large, as income, and stock dividends, however made,
as capital." Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 108 (1868).
While this rule is subject to qualification in certain cases,
such, for instance, as where the cash dividend represents
purely an appreciation in value of assets and not accumulated earnings, it is susceptible of almost unqualified application. This is the view which has been adopted by the
United States Supreme Court. Gibbons v. Mahon, 136
U. S. 549 (1890).
The second rule, which is the "Kentucky rule" provides
that every distribution declared during the continuance
of the income beneficiaries' interest is income, regardless
of when earned and regardless of the effect of such distribution on the Value of the stock. Cox v. Gaulbert's Estate,
148 Ky. 409 (1912). This, of course, favors the income beneficiary at heavy expense to the corpus of the trust. As our
own Supreme Court has said in Nirdlinger's Estate, 290
Pa. 457 (1927), Kentucky is now probably the only State
adhering to it.
The third rule, often referred to as the "American
rule," and which has been adopted by the greater weight
of authority, is the Pennsylvania rule as laid down in
Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857). This is the so-called
theory of apportionment and declares that in every
extraordinary distribution whether of cash, script or stock,
the time when the profits were earned by the corporation
determines who the recipient of the extraordinary distribution should be and to what extent, and that apportionment should be made accordingly between income and
corpus.
It is interesting to note that although the court specificially based the decision in that case on the ground of
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the time at which the earnings distributed by the corporations were actually earned, this is not the way in which
they determined the basis for the apportionment. In point
of fact, what it did was to ascertain the market value of
the shares held in the trust at the date of the testator's
death. It then determined the market value of the same
shares after the declaration and payment of the stock dividend involved. By this process it found that the first market value of the original shares had been to some extent
depleted or impaired as a result of the stock dividend, and
it therefore held that so many of the dividend shares as
were necessary in order to hold intact or make good the
original market value of the original shares should be
awarded to and retained by the corpus but that the balance
should be distributed as income.
Earp's Appeal was a case of a stock dividend, and
that has been the nature of the extraordinary distributions
in the vast majority of adjudicated cases in Pennsylvania.
In a long and unbroken line of decisions, involving stock
dividends, this rule has been followed ever since, as the
Court itself has stated over and over again and finally
repeated in Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 462 (1927),
in which almost all the Pennsylvania law on the subject
is reviewed.
Not only has it been consistently followed in cases of
stock dividends but also in cases of extraordinary cash
dividends: Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344 (1891) though the
total cash dividend was awarded to corpus; Stokes' Estate,
240 Pa. 277 (1913); and Stokes' Estate (No. 2), 240 Pa.
288 (1913), where the extra cash dividend was apportioned
between corpus and income. With respect to rights to
subscribe to stock, there was at first much conflict in the
decisions: Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. 256 (1870); Moss'
Appeal, 83 Pa. 264 (1877); Biddle's Estate, 99 Pa. 278
(1882); Eisner's Estate, 175 Pa. 143 (1896); Thompson's
Estate, 262 Pa. 278 (1918) ; Veech's Estate, 74 Pa. Sup. Ct.
373 (1920). But finally in a recent decision, Jones v. Integrity Trust Company, 292 Pa. 149 (1928), the apportionment
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rule has been adopted with respect to subscription rights as
well. It has also been applied to a liquidation by the corporation, or on a sale by the trustee shortly before the liquidation and which the Court held to be tantamount thereto:
McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78 (1919). Still more recently,
in Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457 (1927), the Supreme Court
extended the doctrine to a case where there was no liquidation or other distribution whatever in contemplation by
the corporation, but the trustee sold the shares at a price
largely in excess of their actual value at the inception of
the trust. The Court held that the increase in so far
as it represented accumulated earnings since the testator's
death, was distributable as income. It is to be noted, however, that the total increase in value was not given to the
life tenants either in McKeown's Estate or in Nirdlinger's
Estate. In McKeown's Estate the difference between the
book value at the date of sale and the book value at the date
of the inception of the trust was the amount distributed,
although the price realized on the sale was about $45,000 in
excess of this difference and this excess was awarded to
corpus. And in Nirdlinger's Estate, the original or intact value at the inception of the trust was $20,000; the.sale
price was $170,000, and yet only $40,000 of the $150,000
profit realized was held to be attributable to income earned since the date of the trust and therefore
distributable to the life beneficiary. In both cases, the
Court holds that distributions on such sales are minor
liquidations, whatever that may mean, and also that the
portion of the profit realized over and above that represented by accumulated earnings is an enhanced value or
super value due to good will, appreciation of assets or some
similar element. It will at once be seen that the extensions of the rule adopted in McKeown's Estate and in
Nirdlinger's Estate present complicated accounting problems which make proper apportionment, always difficult,
still more difficult in such- instances.
In addition, the Court has introduced a further corn-
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plication. In Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449 (1926), there
was under consideration a 100 pet cent. stock dividend
of the Fire Association of Philadelphia. Six years after
the inception of the trust the corporation paid a heavy
loss caused by the San Francisco earthquake. The effect
of this payment exhausted all the undistributed income
accumulated since the testator's death and partially depleted that existing prior thereto. It reduced the book
or liquidating value of the stock from $142.61 per share to
$71.09 per share. The Court held that to the extent of this
loss, except as had been made up by later capital contributions, the intact or original value of the shares at the
inception of the trust was to be reduced. The Court was
not entirely unanimous on this point, however, and a
strong dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Kephart
on the ground that the loss was an operating loss and not
a capital loss and that the result of the majority's action
was unduly to prejudice the corpus or remainder.
The foregoing is a somewhat superficial summary of
the development of the Pennsylvania apportionment theory
applied to extraordinary distributions-and necessarily superficial, having regard to the reasonable length of this
paper.
It may perhaps suffice, however, for some consideration of the effect of the rule.
The basis upon which all of the cases have proceeded
is that the Massachusetts rule, being purely arbitrary, does
not work exact justice as between income beneficiaries
and remaindermen, and that it causes distributions to
be arbitrarily made without due regard to the actual fact
of when the corporate earnings were acquired and without
regard to the equities of the situation. On the other hand,
it is claimed for the apportionment theory that these results are avoided and that the distributions made thereunder are equitable as between income and corpus.
Rules of law are not established or intended to be
adopted for the satisfaction of the courts or the lawyers
who practice before them, but to provide regulations for
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orderly conduct and for the orderly transaction of business
by the people who have to live under and abide by them.
Consequently, it is desirable that any rule of law, particularly when applicable to purely business matters, should
be as easily understandable as possible and as convenient
and simple in its application as the circumstances will
permit.
Our own Supreme Court, throughout the seventytwo years since Earp's Appeal was decided, has consistently recognized that the Massachusetts rule was far more
convenient and that there were many substantial, practical difficulties connected with the enforcement of the
Pennsylvania apportionment theory. Nearly every time
the court has referred to the question of inconvenience
and difficulty, it has taken occasion to point out that such
matters should not be considered when the rights of the
parties in interest are concerned. This statement appears
in many cases and has been repeated recently both in McKeown's Estate and Nirdlinger's Estate. Admitting, then,
that there are serious complications and difficulties attendant upon the application of the Pennsylvania rule, does the
result reached warrant its adoption?
The whole basis of our Pennsylvania decisions rests
upon the time when the earnings were accumulated by
the corporation as the basis for determining the apportioninent. In Earp's Appeal, however, as has been previously
mentioned, the actual time when earnings were realized
was never ascertained and the Court deduced this simply
by a comparison of the market values of the stock at two
. iven times. Value of some time, whether market value,
book value, what the Court calls actual or intrinsic value
-at any rate, some kind of value-has almost uniformly
been the test adopted in order to determine when the earning-s accrued. Yet it is believed that this in itself is no very
safe criterion. The exact time at which corporate profits
have been earned which go to make up the basis of any
value attributed to the stock can never be accurately as-
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certained. Profits or earnings realized ten years hence
are often due to expenditures of today, and vice versa.
The effect of corporate losses, as in Dickinson's
Estate, also presents another example of the difficulty
and inaccuracy in applying the earnings basis. In that
case not all the Court itself could agree on what was a
capital, and what an operating loss. And how large then
must a loss be to deserve consideration? And if the
loss occurs after several extraordinary distributions will the
income beneficiary receive all further distributions, owing
to the loss having wiped out the original value of the stock?
Furthermore, assuming there never is a loss, there is no
accurate method of allocating profits realized at one time
to or over any particular period, and while income tax
and similar laws may provide means for arbitrarily determining income in the sense in which they apply that
term, this does not alter the facts.
Value may or may not have anything to do with the
question of earnings. The actual operation may show a
large loss but the value of the security, whether book or
market value. may, owing to appreciation in assets, show
a larger enhancement. Only a detailed and expert analysis of the corporation's books may show this to be the
reason. While Earp's Appeal was decided upon the basis
of market values and that fact was commented upon in
numerous succeeding cases, in Moss' Appeal the Court vehemently discarded this as the test, saying that in order
to determine these questions it was necessary to go down
through what the Court termed "the shifting sands of the
stock market" and to ascertain the actual or intrinsic
value of the securities. Later, in Smith's Estate, 140 Pa.
344 (1891), the Court specifically repudiated market value
as a test, saying that while it was evidence on the issue,
the intrinsic value of the shares was to be ascertained from
the amount and value of the assets; and this again was confirmed still more strongly in Eisner's Estate, 175 Pa. 143
(1896), and again in Stokes' Estate (both cases), 240 Pa.
277 and 240 Pa. 288 (1913). In the first case it- was held
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that it was the actual and not the market value which
was important and that this actual or intrinsic value is
to be ascertained from the best methods at command.
Just what these methods are has never been definitely
explained. In the succeeding cases after Stokes' Estate,
book value has been almost universally used and yet, as
everyone knows, the book value at which the corporation
carries its assets may have no relation whatever to their
actual or intrinsic value at the particular time in question.
Later, in Thompson's Estate, 262 Pa. 278 (1918), we
find the Court saying that they have no concern with book
value and that it is only the actual value in which they
are interested. And still later, in Dickinson's Estate and
again in Nirdlinger's Estate, Packer's Estate and Jones
v. Integrity Trust Company, it is flatly stated that market
value has nothing, whatever to do with the question.
It would seem, in view of the difficulty of obtaining
a proper test for determining when the earnings have been
made by the corporation, that little is to be gained by endeavoring to apply the apportionment theory. For if the
time when earnings are realized can never be accurately
determined, the whole basis of the apportionment theory
falls. It would also seem that if the application of value
of any particular kind gives a proper indication as to when
earnings have been realized, then the question of what this
value is and how it should be determined is still so uncertain and so unsettled that it cannot be a matter of practical
application. And if both or either of these statements
are correct, then is it not true that the arbitrary or Massachusetts rule is in the long run just about as apt to do
justice as between the parties in interest as the theory of
apportionment? And after all is not the method used in
applying the apportionment rule just as arbitrary and just
as much a matter of chance as the Massachusetts method?
And there is another consideration which has, so far
as yet appears, never been presented in any case decided
by the Supreme Court. In nearly every instance there
has been but one individual or one class of income benefici-
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aries. If we assume that a man die leaving a will in which
he creates a trust which provides that the income shall be
paid to A for life and after A's death, then to B for life,
and then after B's death, the remainder to C, we have some
slightly different considerations. Ordinarily, the question
is considered purely as between A and C, but if the apportionment theory be applied and all extraordinary distributions not impairing the original value of the stock, whatever
that may be found to be, are awarded to.A, does it not necessarily result in a reduction of the amount of income which
after A's death will be payable to B? And why is the
Court justified in assuming, in the absence of any specific
declaration to the contrary, that the creator of the trust
is not equally desirous of insuring the same regular flow
of income to B as he is to A?
Then, further, consider the practical difficulty -,hich
faces a trustee holding corporate stock under sbch a trust
as has been outlined. Let us say that the trust company
receives at the inception of the trust one thousand shares
of the X corporation. Five years later a stock dividend
of 100 per cent. is declared, and as a result thereof the
trustee receives an additional one thousand shares. What
distribution must the trustee make as between A, .the income beneficiary, and B, who is entitled to the remainder?
It is submitted that the trustee has not the slightest idea
what ought to be done about it. Strictly following the
apportionment rule, it will have to ascertain first what
the actual or intrinsic value of the one thousand original
shares was at the date of the testator's death. That in
itself is an undertaking. The corporation's offices may
be in San Francisco or even in a foreign country. It may
be able to get the corporation's statement of its book value
and again it may not. If it does, it cannot necessarily
accept that but must analyze it to see if it correctly represents the assets then on hand, for book value is no more
the test than the market value. It if does not get it through
voluntary action of the corporate officials it cannot subpoena the necessary testimony unless it is all in Penn-
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sylvania and even then it involves a law suit. It must next,
under Thompson's Estate, investigate all five years to see
whether any untiusnal loss has occurred which would reduce
the original actual value of the shares. Having done all
this, it must then ascertain what is the actual value of the
original one thousand shares after the declaration and payment of the stock dividend. This will require as much
analysis, judgment and experience as the first valuation.
Assuming it can and will do these things, it is then required
to make such an apportionment of the new one thousand
shares as will leave the original value of the first one thousand shares intact at whatever net figure that has been
determined to be. To the extent that none of the new dividend shares are necessary to be retained for this purpose,
it is supposed to issue them forth to A, the income beneficiary.
It is fairly safe to hazard a guess that it will do nothing
of the kind and that it probably should not. If it happens
to be incorrect in any of its calculations, then the remaindermen, who may at that time not even be living persons
and available for consultation, may, upon becoming entitled to the corpus in remainder, surcharge the trustee
to the extent that an incorrect distribution has been made
and the corpus prejudiced. The only safe thing for the
trustee to do is to carry in the capital account of the trust
the entire one thousand dividend shares, and that is almost
universally what all the trust companies throughout Pennsylvania have been doing. The result is that if the life
tenant, having heard of the distribution, asserts claim of
right to the dividend shares, the trustee will be involved in
inconvenient and perhaps expensive litigation in order to
determine the question. And, judging from the number of
reversals which have occurred on appeals from the Orphans'
Court to the Supreme Court, it is no easy matter to determine, for men of the caliber of the Orphans' Court
Judges throughout Pennsylvania would not be apt to err so
often if the questions involved were other than difficult
and complicated.
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The same considerations apply to extra cash dividends.
As a matter of fact, nearly all of the trust companies
throughout Pennsylvania consider such distributions income as a matter of course and make full distribution of the
total extra cash dividend to the life tenant. Some of them
may find that this method of handling extraordinary cash
distributions may prove expensive to them when the remaindermen are in position to do something about it, for,
as we have seen in Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344 (1891), the
entire extra cash dividend may be awarded to corpus.
Many corporations have for years declared extra cash
dividends every year. Is the trustee to be put to the
necessity of following through this whole procedure every
time such a dividend is declared, at the risk of being surcharged some day in case it does not do it?
The dilemma of the trustee is by no means exhausted
by these statements. The Court has uniformly held that
presumptively every extraordinary distribution is income
and belongs to the income beneficiary: Boyer's Appeal,
224 Pa. 144 (1909); McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78 (1919),
and numerous other cases therein cited. If that be correct,
and if, as held in Thompson's Estate, 262 Pa. 278 (1918),
the trustee has no right to take sides in the matter
or make a contest on behalf of either the income beneficiary
or the remaindermen, then it would seem that everything
is to be income. Otherwise the trustee must not only make
the detailed examinations previously outlined but disregard
the presumption of income and make a contest, in which
case it will be subject to the criticism of the Court and,
failing to do so, may be subject ultimately to the more
serious possibility of surcharge by the remaindermen.
If the question involved is on rights to subscribe to an
issue of stock, then pretty much the same considerations
obtain as in the case of extra cash dividends or stock dividends. But if the trustee sells the stock and, as in Nirdlinger's Estate, the price realized is greatly in excess of
the original intact value, then the trustee has another
question to decide and must ascertain how much of the ex-
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cess represents mere increase due to accumulated earnings
and how much over and above that is due to good will or
other elements reflected in the enhanced market price.
The possibility of error in such a calculation is enormous
and the consequences, both in inconvenience and liability
previously outlined, are again present.
Another important consideration is the intention attributed by the Supreme Court to the creator of the trust
when he merely provides that the income shall be distributed and gives no specific direction to serve as a guide
in determining what he considers as income. Every jurisdiction, regardless of what rule it follows, has recognized
that the question is, after all, almost entirely a question
of the creator's intention. See annotation, 24 American
Law Reports 9, at p. 17; and for Pennsylvania in particular,
Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 481 (1907) and Boyer's Appeal,
224 Pa. 144 (1909). In Boyer's Appeal, the Court so expressed itself in the following unmistakable language:
"And then, after all, the rule for the determination of controversies over dividends between life tenants
and remaindermen should be to give each just what
the donor intended each to have. As has been said,
the intent of the grantor or testator is the pole stat
for the guidance of the courts."
But in the absence of any specific direction by the
grantor or testator, a provision that the income is to be
paid to designated beneficiaries, still leaves open the
question of what he intends or means by the use of the
word "income." In numerous cases specific language such
as "dividends," "rents," "profits" and other kindred terms
are used and furnish the basis of many decisions, but where
merely the word "income" is used, it. is a more open
question of construction; and although, in such cases, the
Court has uniformly restated the rule as to the intention
expressed in Boyer's Appeal, it has invariably held that the
intention is to apply the apportionment theory.
It is submitted that this construction would cause considerable astonishment to the average business man. Re-
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gardless of what might or might not be held to be income
under the arbitrary definitions of income tax laws, he
would unquestionably regard all ordinary cash dividends,
and probably extraordinary cash dividends as well, in the
nature of income. A stock dividend he would certainly
consider as an addition to his original investment; and
though possibly he might consider the sale of rights to subscribe as income which he would expect to consume, clearly the investment of additional money in the purchase of
stock under rights to subscribe would rank as capital investment. And, similarly, if he sold his holdings, whether
only his original investment, or, in addition, any stock dividends or additional stock purchased under subscription
rights, and sold the whole at a largely enhanced value,
he would know, of course, that he would have to pay income tax on the capital gain which he realized; but he
would none the less consider it, not as income, but as increased capital investment; and the income tax laws themselves recognize that this is a capital gain even while taxing
it as income.

Furthermore, his object in creating the trust is presumably to protect the income beneficiary either from his or
her own inexperience or extravagance and to that end to insure him or her a regular recurring flow of income. This
must certainly be the case where he also hedges the trust
about with the protection of a spendthrift trust provision.
Under these circumstances, to award to the income beneficiary large blocks of stock which can readily be sold and
the proceeds dissipated-or, in fact, anything other than the
ordinary cash accruals from the trust-would probably
occasion its creator considerable surprise. The apportionment theory, as the Supreme Court has laid it down, seems
to assume that if the creator of the trust uses the word "income" alone, that word is broad enough to cover, and was
intended by him to cover, every conceivable kind of distribution to which the apportionment theory applies. The effect
of the spendthrift trust provision upon the apportionment
doctrine has never been raised on appeal to the Supreme
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Court. It was, however, specifically ruled by the Orphans'
Court of Allegheny County and was one of the reasons
on the basis of which the Court held that the testator's
intention was clearly opposed to any such distribution as
income. The 'stock dividend there in question was decreed in its entirety to corpus. Pitcairn's Estate, 70 P. L.
J. 417 (1922).
If the extraordinary distributions other than extra
cash dividends are allowed to remain in the trust, the income beneficiary is not injured, for he of course receives the
increased income from the additional property added to the
trust fund. On the other hand, through constant depletions
in the trust fund, by the application of the apportionment
-theory, the regular periodic income may well be decreasedat any rate, it will not be likely to increase-and it may
happen that the income beneficiary will suffer. Such is
usually the case in trusts where the income depends upon
a more or less fixed principal consisting solely of high-grade
bonds, and the analyses of investments so widely distributed today by experienced investment bankers, all show
that over long periods of time those investment lists having
a fair proportion of common stocks of seasoned dividendpaying corporations have shown better results by reason
of accretions in the way of stock dividends and similar
extraordinary corporate distributions. Would it not be
more reasonable to suppose that this is precisely what the
creator of any trust who did not otherwise specifically
provide, both desired and intended? Protection for his beneficiary induces the creation of the trust in the first place,
and, presumably, either large distribution to one who needed
protection or shrinkage in the purchasing power of the
total income would be the last thing intended.
Irrespective of whether the views herein expressed
are correct or not, it seems quite clear that the apportionment doctrine is so firmly imbedded in the law of
Pennsylvania that the courts will always apply it to extraordinary corporate distributions in trust estates. The
trend, as evidenced by Nirdlinger's Estate, where it was
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applied to something not in reality a corporate distribution
at all, indicates that, if anything, it will be extended rather
than curtailed. Therefore, if any Pennsylvania lawyer is
engaged in drafting a trust instrument wherein the creator
of the trust desires to guard against the effects of the apportionment doctrine, his only hope is to provide specifically
for the retention of all extraordinary distributions by the
trustee as a part of the corpus of the trust. But the difficulty with this is that there is a serious doubt whether
such a direction is valid and legal.
While the Supreme Court has uniformly reaffirmed
the statement in Boyer's Appeal as to the conclusive weight
to be given to the creator's direction and, until very recently, has done this without qualification of any kind
whatsoever, the most recent expression of the Court may
well cast considerable doubt upon the safety of such
practice. In Jones v. Integrity Trust Company, 292 Pa.
149 (1928), Mr. Justice Simpson at the close of the opinion
says as follows:
"Our attention has been called to the fact that in
some quarters it is supposed that our prior decisions
on the subject would be applicable in cases of extraordinary stock dividends and rights to subscribe, even
though the testator or settler who created the trust,
had provided a different method of distribution under
such circumstances. This is incorrect; what the will
or deed specifies must be carried into effect, so far
as it is legal." (Italics supplied.)
This would have been very gratifying language had it not
been for the words "so .far as it is legal." They leave us
somewhat in the frame of mind enjoyed by the general
public when President Coolidge announced that he did not
choose to run. For the effect of the otherwise clear statement that the creator's directions would be carried out and
his intention respected is entirely dependent upon the
question as to whether his direction is valid. One is left
with the impression that the Court at first definitely intended to decide that it would carry out whatever inten-
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tion the creator of the trust expressed with respect to these
matters. The addition of the qualification at the end, however, while it may have been purely a cautionary statement
by the Court, raises greater doubt than that, for the reason
that the leading case in New York (Matter of Osborne,
209 N. Y. 450, (1913), in which New York abandoned the
Kentucky rule and in an extremely able opinion adopted
Pennsylvania's apportionment doctrine, also riised the
doubt as to the extent to which the testator's direction
could be carried out in these cases. The Court definitely
stated that the creator of the trust could provide that what
would otherwise be principal should be considered as income and be treated as such. But with equal emphasis
it then proceeded to say that in fact what would be income
under the decisions of the State of New York could not
be declared principal or corpus by the testator, because
such a direction would violate the New York statutes prohibiting accumulations of income. While the statement
was obiter in that case, it was shortly followed by the decision in In re Megrue, 217 N. Y. 653 (1915), in which the
Court specifically holds that such a direction contained
in a codicil invalidated the codicil because in violation of
the statute against accumulations.
Although Jones v. Integrity Trust Company indicates
that the Court intended to leave these matters to the desire of the persons creating the trust, it may very well
be that it had in mind the Osborne and Megrue cases in
New York and Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Act of 1853,
P. L. 503, prohibiting accumulations of income from real
or personal property except during the minority of the
beneficiary. In any event, instead of clarifying the situation it has.cast sufficient doubt upon it so as to cause extreme nervousness on the part of many members of our
profession who have drafted wills and other trust instruinents providing for the retention of these extraordinary
distributions as corpus.
Those who believe that the Pennsylvania apportionment rule is less desirable than the so-called Massachusetts rule and who doubt the legality of corrective instruc-
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tions by the creator of the trust, have, then, no recourse
to provide against the application of the apportionment
doctrine except by addressing themselves to the Legislature. And it is believed that, for the reasons hereinbefore discussed, such a course is advisable. In New York.
as a result of the discussion in the Megrue case, the New
York Legislature. has amended the personal property law
and Section 17 (a) now provides that all stock dividends
shall be considered principal unless otherwise expressed
in the trust instrument and "that the addition of any such
stock dividend to the principal of such trust as above provided shall not be deemed an accumulation of income
within the meaning of this article."
There are many phases of this question impossible
to discuss within reasonable limits of time. For the benefit of anyone sufficiently interested to pursue it further,
the annotation in 24 American Law Reports, pp. 9 to 122,
is an exhaustive treatment of almost every, conceivable
phase of the subject. And for a review of the Pennsylvania
cases in particular, Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457 (1927),
is almost a digest of the law.
WILLIAM R. SCOTT
Pittsburgh, Pa.

